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DISCOVERY AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN
CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.*
Wide-ranging pretrial discovery is an integral part of contempo-
rary American civil litigation, particularly in cases involving substantial
stakes. Pretrial discovery, strictly defined, is entirely unavailable in
civil law jurisdictions. Procedures fimctionally similar to pretrial dis-
covery are available in civil law systems, and American parties to trans-
national civil litigation sometimes attempt to use those civil law
procedures.' However, the experience is often frustrating for Ameri-
can lawyers because the civil law judges are not readily receptive to
these endeavors. Indeed, the American endeavors in discovery from
foreign sources often are deeply disturbing to the bench, bar, and
governmental authorities abroad, and engender hostility to these en-
deavors. 2 This attitude in other countries can be interpreted as anti-
foreign sentiment, and specifically antipathy to American-style civil lit-
igation. No doubt attitudes of that sort often exist among civil law
judges. However, there are deeper reasons for the reluctance of civil
law judges to assist in ventures in which American parties seek pretrial
discovery of evidence abroad for use in American legal proceedings.
This article undertakes briefly to explore these reasons.
I. AmvmcAN AND CrviL lAw CONCEPTS OF JUDICIA RoLE COMPARED
The salient procedures for pretrial discovery of evidence under
American procedure are those for deposition of witnesses and discov-
ery of documents. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are the basic
model. Under Federal Rules 26 and 30, pretrial discovery depositions
may be taken of parties, of party-affiliated persons, such as employees
of corporate parties, and of non-party ("third party") witnesses. They
* Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Director, The American
Law Institute.
1 See RESrATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF ThE UNED STATES § 442,
REPORTERS' NO=s, note 1, and sources cited there.
2 See id. at notes 2-5.
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may be taken as of right and without court permission. 3 Refusal of a
party to submit to a deposition can be enforced through various sanc-
tions, including the severe sanctions provided in Rule 37 of dismissal
of a plaintifffs suit and entry of default against a defendant. 4 Under
Rule 45, the power of subpoena can be employed by a party, without
leave of court, to compel discovery testimony from a reluctant or hos-
tile third party witness. Under Rule 26(b) (1), the scope of a discovery
deposition is bounded only by the requirement that the questions be
"reasonably calculated to lead" to admissible evidence. The duration
of a deposition is limited only by the time commitment the examining
party is willing to make or by a protective order of a court. Protective
orders are sought infrequently and typically only after extended and
contentious interchanges between counsel.
Under Federal Rule 34, discovery of documents and the degree
of specificity in the designation of the documents demanded is subject
to no greater restrictions. Discovery of documents can be pursued on
demand of a party without court order, and its scope is limited only by
the requirement of Rule 26(b) (1) described above. In addition,
under the 1993 revision of Federal Rule 26(a) (1), as well as under
some state rules, parties must make production of certain categories
of documents spontaneously, that is, without either demand by the
opposing party or by court order. The depth of a documents discov-
ery demand is effectively limited only by the time commitment the
discovering party is willing to make in sifting through the material
produced in response, or by a protective order. Orders protecting
against documents discovery probably are sought somewhat more fre-
quently than protective orders concerning depositions but are not
often or readily granted. Efforts to obtain such protection also are
typically preceded by extended and contentious interchanges between
counsel.
This system of pretrial discovery is unique to the United States.
Other common law countries have nothing like it. In most common
law jurisdictions, so I am informed, pretrial depositions are unusual
and in some countries are typically employed only in circumstances of
the kind specified in Rule 27, such as where the witness will be un-
available for trial.5 In other common law countries, similar restraint is
3 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b).
4 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
5 See Geoffrey Hazard, From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 1998); 1 RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 1; e.g., G. WATSON & M. McGOWEN, ONTARIO CIL PRACriCE 567-600
(1998) (differentiating right of deposition of opposing party from deposition of third
party witnesses only upon court approval).
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exercised in discovery of documents. Documents are subject to dis-
covery only when "relevant" to the proceeding. Relevance for this
purpose is defined by reference to the pleadings in the case, and the
rules of pleading require full specification of claims and defenses. 6 In
our sister common law jurisdictions, therefore, "fishing expeditions"
are not merely prohibited but are practically impossible given the
combined effect of the rules of pleading, which require specification
of facts, and the principle of relevance, which requires demonstrable
relationship between facts pleaded and discovery sought.7
However, all the common law systems begin with a concept of the
adversary system, which defines the roles of the judge and the parties'
advocates. The definitions of these roles in common law systems are
traditionally, and at least nominally, similar. That is, the role of the
judge is to decide between competing presentations of evidence and
law that are tendered by the advocates. The corresponding role of the
advocates is to develop and make those presentations. The judge is
not responsible for there being an adequate development of the evi-
dence during trial and afortiori is not responsible for there being ade-
quate pretrial discovery of evidence. Nor is the judge responsible for
getting at "the truth."'8 Thejudge simply chooses between the conten-
tions of law and the versions of facts laid before him by the parties.
The premise in civil law jurisdictions is entirely different, at least
formally so. Under the civil law procedural systems, the judge is re-
sponsible for deciding a case according to the truth of the matter.
The judge decides both fact and law because there is no jury or any-
thing like it. It is assumed that the truth of the matter will be revealed
by relevant evidence. Under the civil law, it therefore follows that the
judge is responsible for eliciting relevant evidence. The parties in civil
law litigation are represented by advocates, and the advocates are em-
powered and obligated to assist their clients in presenting their re-
6 See generally PRE-TRLAj. AND PRE-HEAuING PROCEDURES WORLDWIDE (Charles
Platto ed., 1990).
7 Cf. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163 (1993) (rejecting a contention that there should be a "heightened plead-
ing standard," in other words more stringent requirements of particularity, in claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). There have long been calls that such a standard of pleading
be adopted generally. See Moses Lasky, Memorandum for the Committee on Rule 8, 13
F.R.D. 275 (1952).
The American College of Trial Lawyers in 1997 has made a functionally similar
proposal, to require that the standard for discovery be "relevance" of the material to
be discovered to the issues rather than the standard of "reasonably calculated to lead"
to admissible evidence.
8 Cf. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. Rimv.
1031 (1975).
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spective sides of the case. However, in principle, the advocates'
function is to assist the judge in fulfillment of the judicial responsibil-
ity, rather than, as in the common law, the judge being responsible
only in terms of the advocates' previously exercised responsibilities of
presentation. In the civil law concept, the advocates are supposed to
provide comment and suggestions to the judge, with a deference
which varies from one civil law jurisdiction to another. But at least in
theory they have no power of initiative after they have presented the
claims and defenses in the pleadings, except with the assent of the
judge.
II. THE ABSENCE OF PRETRIAL IN CIVIL LAW ADJUDICATION
A derivative of this fundamental premise about the roles of judge
and advocates is that the civil law system has no "pretrial," let alone
pretrial discovery. "Pre" trial implies an adjudication process with at
least two stages, pretrial and then trial itself. The need for a two-stage
process is evident in an adjudicative system based on jury trial. Ajury
is an assemblage constituted ad hoc whose members need not be con-
vened until their time on the stage has arrived, and who should go
home when their role has been played. The jurors decide facts, not
legal questions, and the rendition of their verdict constitutes fulfill-
ment of that function. Efficient use of ajury's time requires that pres-
entation of the evidence be concentrated in a single continuous
session. Such a concentrated session is the "trial"; everything prior to
trial is "pretrial."9
According to modem legal standards, the parties to the litigation
should have opportunity to know somewhat beforehand-in a pre-
view, so to speak-the substance of the opposing party's proof. That
opportunity includes time to think over that evidence and to arrange
to counter it so far as possible. Because ajury trial is to be a concen-
trated session, opportunity for such a preview must be afforded some-
what before the jury session commences. Hence, pretrial discovery is
a logical necessity in a modem system based on jury trial, if the prem-
ise is accepted that litigants should have a preview of the evidence that
will be presented against them. Most common law countries other
than the United States no longer use juries very much. Nevertheless,
they adhere to the tradition of concentrated trial procedure. By the
same token, they adhere more or less to the need for pretrial
discovery.
9 See Benjamin Kaplan, Civil Procedure-Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9
BuFF. L. REV. 409 (1960); Cf John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Proce-
dure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823 (1985).
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As Professor Benjamin Kaplan explained long ago,10 an adjudica-
tion in the civil law system proceeds according to an entirely different
logic. In that system, the central figure, around whose function the
task of the advocates center, is not the jury, but thejudge. The central
task in a civil law adjudication is for the judge to identify the legal and
factual issues involved and to decide them correctly. Also, and of
equal practical importance, the judge is a permanent official who can
adjourn court sessions to later dates as convenient. The logic of in-
quiry in that framework is to subdivide a case issue by issue, or by
clusters of issues, considering both facts and law as to each issue. Con-
cerning any such issue or cluster of issues, law and facts can be consid-
ered together because there is no jury to share in the decisional
process. The function of preview for the parties can be accomplished
by receiving items of evidence on the basis of the court's making a
provisional or tentative appraisal of their significance and conducting
further and deeper inquiry only as necessary. The necessity for such
further inquiry will be signaled by the party against whom the evi-
dence was received. Evidence received on a tentative basis is taken as
truth if there is no negative signal from the opposing party, but, if
there is such a signal, the evidence remains open for disputation or
discount at a subsequent session of the court. In contrast, the logic of
ajury trial is to subdivide the case into issues of law, regardless of the
relationship of legal issues to each other, and issues of fact. Then, the
issues of fact are further subdivided into a preview (discovery) and a
plenary stage of presentation (the trial).
At a more fundamental level, the function of preview (discovery)
in a jury trial system is to permit the parties and their advocates to
make estimates of the kind, degree, and extent of evidence that will
suffice to convince a jury without incurring undue risk of boring or
confusing the jury." These estimates by the opposing advocates are
derived with regard for counter-maneuvers and counter-estimates in
the opposing camp. Pretrial discovery, therefore, is a system whose
primary function is to inform the advocates, rather than informing
either the judge (who ordinarily knows little or nothing of the proofs
until trial commences and who will be essentially a neutral umpire
come trial) or the jury (which will receive only a small refined residue
of the material processed by counsel in discovery).
10 See Kaplan, supra note 9.
11 A vivid demonstration of the need of a party protagonist to winnow evidence
down to that which is convincing without being confusing is the contrast in the
presentations in the OJ. Simpson case, which involved mind-numbing prolongation,
and that in the Timothy McVeigh case, where the prosecution, guided by the debacle
in "O.J.," shortened the case by abandoning much potentially admissible evidence.
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In contrast, in the civil law system, the critically important func-
tion of exploring and sifting evidence is performed by the judge. The
judge needs to know the facts necessary to decide the case, but needs
to know only that much. The civil law judge's inquiry is not "What
evidence should be heard to understand the whole case?" but "What
evidence do I require to reach a justifiable decision?" The informa-
tion needed to decide a case could concern only one or two issues-
for example, the terms of a contract without regard to evidence con-
cerning breach, or the nature of defendant's allegedly tortious con-
duct without regard to evidence concerning injury or damages.
Considerations of efficiency would lead the civil law judge to ap-
proach complicated litigation in precisely this fashion-that is, issue
by issue. The mind of the judge in a civil law jurisdiction, thus, is the
medium of forensic exploration as well as the medium of forensic
determination.
In this light, we can better understand the negative reaction of
civil law systems to the outreach of American discovery. The immedi-
ate impact of American discovery in a civil law jurisdiction is exper-
ienced by the judges as an invasion of their role and responsibility. As
we have seen, under the civil law system, the judge takes initiative in
developing the evidence necessary to decide the case. If an American
discovery demand is addressed directly to a foreign party, it comes
across as an attempt to circumvent the judiciary. The American dis-
covery request also comes across as a peremptory demand that the
judge undertake the specified inquiry, regardless of whether the judge
would consider the inquiry to be unwarranted or at best premature.
The judicial reaction abroad, therefore, is much the same as would be
that of a judge in our system if a party made a peremptory demand
under claim of right for a decision that the law has placed wholly
within the judge's discretion-such as the date on which to set a trial.
In this light, we can also better understand the dilemma posed to
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict,12 and why the decision in that case remains anathema in many of
the civil law jurisdictions.
III. Socitrt AEROSPATIALE
Sociitd Aerospatiale presented the question whether provisions of
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commer-
12 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
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cial Matters1 3 preempted the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.1 4 The Federal Rules authorize parties to demand produc-
tion of documents in an opposing party's possession or control, wher-
ever the documents may be located. Accordingly, under the Rules,
demand may be made for production of documents located, for ex-
ample, in Europe in the possession of a company doing business in
the United States. The Rules do not require prior judicial approval.
If administered in accordance with conventional practice in domestic
litigation, the Rules make compliance with such a demand a matter of
legal right for the discovering party. The right is backed by various
sanctions including dismissal of a plaintiffs claim or default judgment
against a defendant. Hence, under the Rules a defendant's resolute
noncompliance with a discovering plaintiffs demand for documents
would lead to a default judgment.15
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters is a treaty to which the United States is a party.
Under the Convention, evidence abroad is to be obtained by applica-
tion to a court in the country where the evidence is located. In the
case of witness testimony, application would be made to the court
where the witness resides. In the case of documents, it would be made
to the court where the custodian of the documents is located.
The procedure specified in the Convention thus conforms to two
legal concepts: a concept of international law, and a concept of the
domestic law of civil law jurisdictions. The concept of international
law is that legal process from one country does not have a direct effect
as of right in another country. Rather, enforcement depends upon
official action in the country where response is to be made. This con-
cept has long been fully accepted under American law, indeed jeal-
ously asserted. It is classically stated in Pennayer v. Neff, where the
Court said: "One of these principles is, that every State possesses ex-
clusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within
its territory .... The other principle of public law.., is, that no State
can exercise directjurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory.' 6
13 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
The Hague, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
14 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWt, OF THE UNITED
STATES § 473 (1987); Note, The Role of the Hague Convention for Gathering Evidence
Abroad. Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 309 (1987).
15 See Note, Strict Enforcement of Extraterritorial Discovery, 38 STAN. L. REV. 841
(1986).
16 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714, 722 (1877).
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From the viewpoint of a civil law jurisdiction, however, equally
important is a concept of domestic law in civil law jurisdictions. As
described above, the civil law concept is that production of evidence,
whether for "discovery," "pretrial," or otherwise, is carried out
through the authority and responsibility of the court and not through
authorization of the advocates for the parties. The notion that a party
has a right to compel production of evidence violates this fundamental
principle of civil law. The violation is comparable to the idea that, in
American litigation, a party would have an absolute right to a particu-
lar jury instruction regardless of the trial judge's determination that
the instruction was superfluous or erroneous. 17 Put differently, recog-
nizing in a party a right to require production of evidence, as distinct
from a party's right to ask the court to require production of evidence,
violates a constitutional principle of adjudication in the civil law
system.
On the other hand, the concept that a party has such a right-a
right not dependent on judicial discretion-has become fundamen-
tal, and perhaps nearly constitutional, in the modern American
scheme of civil litigation. One can find arguments that denial of pre-
trial discovery in criminal cases is a denial of due process.18 Certainly
that view would be congenial to jurists who have been on the Supreme
Court of the United States, perhaps including some who are on the
Court today. On this view, SociMt6 Aerospatiale presented the gravest
kind of legal question in the foreign relations law of the United States:
whether the provisions of a treaty, The Hague Convention, supersede an
American rule of procedure-right to pretrial discovery-of virtually
constitutional standing.
On this interpretation, the decision in Sociitj Aerospatiale can be
understood in sympathetic light from the American viewpoint. Simply
stated, the proposition is that a treaty cannot contravene a constitu-
tional right and, if interpretation of a treaty will permit, the treaty
should not be held to contravene such a virtual constitutional right.
Since interpretation could permit such a construal of The Hague Con-
vention, the Convention was interpreted by the Supreme Court not to
preempt the Federal Rules. Rather, the Convention was held to be
merely an alternative means that could be displaced by the Federal
Rules when, in a trial judge's determination, fairness so required.
Trial judges in the American system of course are guided by American
17 Cf Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1929).
18 See, e.g., H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent? Restrictions
on C0iminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43 RuTrrGERS L. REV. 1089
(1991).
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concepts of fairness, in which the right to pretrial discovery has be-
come a component. American trial judges, exercising the discretion
conferred in Sociiti Aerospatiale, unsurprisingly therefore usually con-
clude that discovery of right under the Federal Rules should dominate
The Hague Convention.19
By the same token, however, this application of the Federal Rules
to foreign parties, specifically discovery demands requiring evidence
from an opposing party situated in a civil law country upon demand,
doubly offends legal authorities in such a country. It is deeply offen-
sive not merely as a matter of international law, which those of us in
this country should understand, but also as a matter of the domestic
law of civil law countries-a dimension which we may not have fully
understood.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF THE CIVIL LAW CONCEPT OF
THE JUDICIAL RoLE
The concept that the judiciary properly controls the quest for evi-
dence in civil litigation is, as indicated above, fundamental in the civil
law system. More importantly, the concept of judicial primacy in the
civil law systems is more than a "means or mode" of the administration
of justice.20 On the contrary, it is a fundamental constitutional con-
cept evolved in the political history of major European countries. By
the way of comparison, the concept of judicial primacy in compelling
production of evidence stands on a par with the concepts embedded
in our Constitution concerning jury trials21 and, for example, the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The European political history on this issue is too complicated
and too important to be encompassed in this discussion. A brief
sketch must suffice. There are at least two quite different traditions
involved, that in Germany and that in France. However, on this issue
the outcomes of the traditions converge.
The judiciary in modern Germany is of course the product of that
country's history. The point of useful beginning is eighteenth century
Prussia under Frederick the Great and his successors as kings and em-
perors in Prussia and thereafter in Imperial Germany.2 2 In that re-
19 Compare, e.g., Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33
(N.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying Convention), with Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp.,
118 F.R.D. 386 (N.J. 1987) (applying Federal Rules).
20 Cf Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
21 Cf Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
22 The analysis here is based on the valuable summary in KENN= FLOYD LED-
FORD, FROM GENERAL ESTATE TO SPECIAL INIREST: GERMAN LAW*vYERs 1878-1933, ch. 1
(1996).
1998] 1025
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW[
gime, the judiciary was regarded as an instrument of the constitution,
under which the monarchy had nearly absolute authority. Not only
the judiciary, but the legal profession as well, were considered instru-
ments for effectuation of that constitution. Judges, therefore, were
expected to enforce the law, and lawyers were expected to refrain
from frustrating its enforcement. To that end, judges were responsible
for obtaining necessary evidence, and lawyers were responsible for
avoiding obstruction of the judicial responsibility.
"Fast forward," as they say, to the twentieth century. The modem
history of Germany includes the collapse of the Imperial Reich at the
end of World War I, then the collapse of the Weimar Republic, then
the Nazi catastrophe in which the judiciary and legal profession inevi-
tably acquiesced and in many cases supported Hider's regime, and
then the struggle after World War II to refound the constitution of the
regime on a democratic basis. The constitution of Germany thus
changed from monarchy prior to World War I, to a dictatorship under
Hitler, to a democracy based on the rule of law. The concept ofjudi-
cial responsibility continues, but since World War II judicial responsi-
bility has been transformed into an institution for effectuation of the
new democratic constitution rather than the older authoritarian con-
stitutions. Judicial control of production of evidence is, as we have
seen, a key element of that judicial responsibility.
An act of imagination is required to appreciate how German
judges could interpret an American demand that they produce evi-
dence in trans-border discovery in civil litigation as an attack on the
constitutional foundation of the democratic regime in modern Ger-
many. However, I submit, not too much imagination. No more imagi-
nation is required than to understand how the Supreme Court of the
United States in Socigtj Aerospatiale could interpret a treaty plainly pre-
empting American pretrial discovery as not preempting the funda-
mental right of pretrial discovery.
The history in France is somewhat different. Here, as in all mod-
em history of France, the key is the French Revolution. 23 The French
Revolution destroyed the constitutional foundation of the Old Re-
gime existing prior to 1789 and gravely disturbed the political and
social structures on which that regime was based. In its place was pro-
claimed a regime based on "liberty, equality, and fraternity," as polit-
23 The analysis here is based on a general history of the French Revolution and its
significance in later French political consciousness. See, e.g., ROBERT TOMBS, FRANCE
1814-1914 (1996). The classic analysis is ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, L'ANCIEN REGIME
ET LA REVOLUTION (New York, Harper & Brothers 1856). A celebrated modem por-
trayal of the French Revolution is SIMON SCHAMA, CrrIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION (1989).
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ical rhetoric expressed it. The legal foundation of the new regime was
the Civil Code ("Napoleonic Code" in our conventional terms), pro-
claimed by the newly constituted General Assembly of the Republic of
France.
In concept, the Civil Code was a complete statement of the law,
concerning all civic relationships. It could be supplemented or dis-
placed only by law-giving of equal legal dignity. Law-giving of equal
dignity could emanate only from the democratically constituted legis-
lature in the form of statutes or of implementing regulations promul-
gated by administrative agencies themselves constituted through the
democratic legislative process. 24
Under the constitutional theory of the French Republic that dis-
placed the Old Regime, the corollary of the principle of legislative
supremacy is that ofjudicial deference. In our legal system, under the
law as pronounced in Marbury v. Madison,25 the judiciary is the ulti-
mate guardian of the Constitution. In France, the concept of judicial
deference reposes in a quite different context than in our American
regime. In France, the judiciary after the French Revolution was not
regarded as a proper source of legal policy, nor is it today. Moreover,
the judiciary has been regarded with some ambivalence, as possibly
presenting something of a threat to the post-revolutionary French Re-
publican regime. The judiciary had been a key element of the Old
Regime prior to the Revolution.26 After the Revolution, the judges
and members of the legal profession generally were sometimes sus-
pect as possibly or even probably monarchists, perpetually contem-
plating that there would be a change of government involving a
return to the old. The French Revolution did not kill monarchism.
To the contrary, as an historical fact, monarchism continued to
threaten the Republican regime, at least until Charles de Gaulle, well
after World War II, provided an alternative model of strong executive
leadership. But wariness has persisted.
The same general attitude toward the judiciary persists in other
European countries, in all of which constitutional history includes
monarchism and, in many countries, leftist and rightist authoritarian
regimes as well. For judges to go beyond the letter of procedural law
would therefore be considered the manifestation of a tendency to-
24 The constitutional justification of administrative authority under American
law, where the Constitution makes no mention of such authority, is essentially simi-
lar-that is, delegation from the legislature.
25 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
26 On the political situation of bar and bench in France at the time of the Revolu-
tion, see generally DAvID BELL, LAWyRS AND CMZENS: Tim MAKING OF A PourciAL ELrIE
IN OLD REGimE FRANCE 185-94 (1994), and sources cited therein.
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ward unconstitutional "activism" on the part of the judiciary. The let-
ter of procedural law in the civil law regimes is that the judiciary is
responsible for obtaining evidence, a responsibility that could not be
delegated. It is a responsibility that certainly could not be delegated
to partisan advocates for litigation parties.
Again, something of an act of imagination is required to appreci-
ate how civil law jurists in the French tradition could interpret an
American initiative in trans-border discovery in civil litigation as fore-
shadowing a restoration of the Bourbons. But perhaps not too much
imagination.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of these differences in constitutional history in modern
democracies, understanding the problems of civil discovery in interna-
tional litigation requires analysis that penetrates deeper than differ-
ences in the "mode or manner" of litigation, and even deeper than
concepts of international law. Rather, it requires an understanding of
fundamental constitutional concepts that are historically embedded
in the social orders of other countries. Because the political history of
those countries is different from ours, so also are their contemporary
constitutional concepts.
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